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Abstract  dependent on initial conditions, stochastic elements
are also incorporated into the analysis. In this study, the effects of an export subsidy for
cotton are analyzed using a linear elasticity model.  COMPARATIVE STATICS OF AN
The  study  explicitly  addresses  the  interaction  of  EXPORT SUBSIDY
current domestic policies with the proposed export
subsidy.  An  export  subsidy  may  be  a  successful  The expected  changes in the cotton industry due
method  of  reducing  the  government  costs  of  the  to an export subsidy can be described by a series of
cotton program.  equations in log differential form obtained from total
differentiation  of the  set  of  equations  describing
initial industry equilibrium. For the purposes of this
Key words: export subsidy, farm programs,  cotton  study, initial equilibrium can be described succinctly
by:
Throughout  the  1980s,  volatile  export  markets  (1)  Qd = f(Pd)
were a cause for concern for U.S. cotton producers,  (2)  QX = g(Pd - S)
particularly  during  the  1985-1986  period  when  (3)  Qs= h(Pp)
world  prices  reached  record lows  as a result of a  (4)  Q = Qs = Qd + Qx
variety of factors,  including  the announcement  by  where Qd is domestic mill use, Qx is total exports, Qs
the U.S. of the  new marketing  loan program.  Be-  is quantity supplied, S is the export subsidy, Pd is the
cause of the volatility of the export market through-  domestic  cotton price and Pp is the "supply-induc-
out the last decade, the direct costs of the domestic  ing"  price to which producers  respond.  This "sup-
target  price  program  for  cotton  were  often  high,  ply-inducing"  price  incorporates  both market  and
causing a renewed interest in export expansion pro-  government policy information (Shumway; Lee and
grams as a way to increase  the domestic price.  Helmberger;  Bailey  and  Womack).  More specifi-
This study presents  quantitative estimates  of the  cally, following Shumway and Bailey and Womack,
probable effects of an export subsidy on the domes-  Pp can be described as:
tic cotton industry. More specifically,  the objective  (5)  Pp = Pd if Pd  > P
of this  study was  to  provide  estimates  of the ex-  (6)  Pp = Ps if Pd  < Ps
pected change in domestic price and direct govern-  where P, is the effective government program price
ment  costs of  a subsidy program.  To quantify  the  as defined by Houck et al.
effects, a linear elasticity model was used. The linear  For the subsidy  to be effective  in raising  the do-
elasticity model used previously obtained estimates  mestic price, restrictions must be placed on imports
of  supply  and  demand  elasticities  to  simulate  of cotton fiber.  Also, under current  (1991)  market
changes from equilibrium.  (See, for example, Sum-  and  farm  program  conditions,  most  cotton stocks
ner  and  Wohlgenant;  Lemieux  and Wohlgenant.)  appear to be pipeline stocks, and thus only negligible
The present study includes an explicit representation  changes in stocks would be anticipated in response
of the domestic farm  programs  currently  in place.  to  an  export  subsidy.  Under  more  volatile  condi-
Because the net impact of  an export subsidy is highly  tions,  stockholding  could  become  an  important
1  With the exception of the United States, most cotton-producing  nations are developing countries. The major importers of
cotton are Japan, Korea, and the European nations. Because of the production and consumption patterns for cotton, there are few
trade restrictions in the major cotton markets. The European nations do, however, employ a trade preference  system that covers
cotton and other important export crops from certain former colonies. Research indicates that this program does not adversely affect
U.S. cotton imports into the European Community  (Sissoko).
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1short-run concern and stock demand would need to  where Kd is the quantity share of domestic consump-
be included in the  equilibrium equations.  For the  tion, and Kx is the quantity share of exports.
purposes of the present study, however, equation (4)  Substituting (7),  (8), and(9a) into (11) and solving
above  will  represent  industry  equilibrium.  This  for dlnPd yields:
equilibrium  framework parallels that used by Sum-  -KxNxa
ner and Wohlgenant.  (12a)  dlnPdd  KXNX)
Total differentiation  of (1) and (2) yields:  which represents the percent change in price if the
(7)  dlnQd = Nd dlnPd  initial  price  is  greater  than  the  effective  support
(8)  dlnQ,  = N(dlnPd - a) with a = dS/Pd  price.
where  Nd  is  the own-price  elasticity  of  domestic  If initial price is below the effective support price,
demand, Nx is the price elasticity of foreign demand  and domestic price remains below the effective sup-
for  U.S.  cotton,  and  "a"  represents the  change  in  port price even after the implementation of the ex-
subsidy as a percentage of the initial market price  port subsidy,  equation (9b)  is substituted  into the
The change in quantity supplied is more difficult  equilibrium condition, yielding:
to evaluate because the change depends on the rela-  KXNXa
tionship  between  Ps,  based  on  government  pro-  (12b)  dlPd =  N+  K
grams, and Pd, the market price. Because producers  d +  x  .respond  to thehigherofthetwoprices  eepos-  which represents  the maximum  possible domestic respond to the higher of the two prices, three possi- prices  P.5'  price change. ble supply responses could occur:  .
ble supply responses could occur:  If initial price is below the effective support price
(9a)  dlnQS = E dlnPd if Pd  > P,
(9b)  dlnQ  = 0 if  Ps  > Pd + dPd  but  the  export  subsidy  will  push domestic  price
(9c)  dlnQs = 0dE  (dlnPd -i  Pf  P  >Ri  Pd>Ps  >+Pd  dabove  the effective support price, then equations (7),
)where  dnQ(8),  and (9c) should be substituted  into (11),  yield- where
(10)  R= (P-  Pd) / Pd  ing:  -K
and E is the price elasticity of supply of U.S. cotton.  (12c)  dlnPd  =  K"
Equation  (9a) represents  a full supply response  to  E - (KdNd + KxN , )
the change in domestic price,  resulting from initial  Thus, the impact of the export subsidy on domestic
price  above  the  effective  support price.  Equation  price is greatly affected by the relationship between
(9b)  represents the situation where domestic price  the announced government program provisions and
remains below the effective support price even after  the initial market  price.  (For a graphical treatment
implementation of the subsidy,  and thus there is no  of an export subsidy, see Houck.)
change  in  quantity  supplied.  Equation  (9c) repre-CT  OVRNM  NT  DIRECT GOVERNMENT  COSTS sents a partial response. In this case, initial domestic
price is  below the effective  support price,  but the  When domestic  price  remains  below  the target
implementation of the subsidy  results  in a "final"  price,  total direct government  costs for deficiency
domestic  price  above  the effective  support  price;  payments can be expressed as:
producers  respond  to  the  difference  between  the  (13)  GC = 0(TP - Pd)Q
final domestic price and the effective support price,  where TP is the target price, Pd is the domestic price
Finally, total differentiation of equation (4) yields  without  any  export  subsidy,  0  is  the  portion  of
the equilibrium condition:  production  eligible for deficiency  payment, and Q,
(11)  dlnQ, = KddlnQd  + KxdlnQx  is the initial level of production.
2 In this study, the effects on domestic demand of changes in the price of imported textiles due to lower foreign cotton prices is
ignored because Wohlgenant found this effect to be small. If we allow for this effect, then equation (1) would become:
(fl)  Qd = f(Pd,  Pm)
where Pm is the unit price of imported textile products. Using this new demand equation to develop equation (12a) would yield:
(f2)  dlnPd =  - (KxNx +  KdNm)a
E - (KdNd +  KxNx + KdNmX)
where Nm is the domestic elasticity of demand for cotton with respect to the price of foreign textiles and X  is the elasticity of price
transmission of the imported textile price with respect to the domestic cotton price.  Based on the percentage of the final textile price
that can be traced to the cost of raw cotton, Wohlgenant found the upper bound of x to be 0.3, and its probable value to be around
0.1. Even using the higher value of X,  the effect on the price change is small. For example,  with Kd= .5,  Km
= .5,  Nx  = -2.00, E = 0.2,
and Nm = 0.5 (Wohlgenant's parameter  values), equation (f2) yields a percentage price change of 14.5  percent and equation (12a)
yields a percentage  price change of 14.8 percent. When a more realistic value of X  is used, that is X = 0.1, then (f2) yields a
percentage price change of 14.7 percent. Given Wohlgenant's results, the choice here was not to include the imported textile effect
in this study because it would complicate the mathematical  exposition with no important effects on the final results of the analysis.
2With an export subsidy, government costs are:  export demand for U.S. cotton. This direct elasticity
(14)  GCS =  C(TP - Pn)(Qs + dQs)+  S*(Qx + dQx)  ignores  the "feedback"  effect that changes  in U.S.
where Pn = Pd + dPd.  cotton price will have on the price of competitors'
Pn is the domestic price after the export subsidy has  cotton.  When  this  price-price  effect  is  included,
been imposed,  S is the per unit subsidy, (Q, + dQs)  Duffy et al. found the resulting elasticity (called the
is the quantity supplied after the subsidy has been  full  elasticity  by Buse)  to be close  to  -1.0.  In the
imposed,  and  (Qx  + dQx)  is the quantity of cotton  current study, an initial export demand elasticity of
exported  after the subsidy has been imposed.  It is  -2.0 was used, based on the estimates  of the direct
apparent from (14) that increases  in domestic price  elasticity  obtained  by Wohlgenant  and  by Duffy,
decrease  deficiency  payments  and thus reduce the  Richardson,  and  Wohlgenant  (1990).  The  lower
direct  government  costs of this part  of the cotton  value of -1.0,  for the full elasticity, was also used in
program.  The  subsidy,  which raises  the  domestic  the simulation. These elasticities represent short-run
price, has its own direct  costs, however.  Thus, the  (one-year)  responses  of quantitity  demanded  to
net effect  of the subsidy  on government costs  de-  changes  in price. Results of the simulation, accord-
pends on the relative magnitudes of the two effects.  ingly,  represent short-run,  not long-run,  effects  of
the subsidy. To estimate the long-run effects, long-
RELEVANT ELASTICITIES  run elasticities  could be used in the framework set
For the analysis, estimates of the own-price elas-  forth in (7)  through  (12).  Because the policy  envi-
ticity  of supply,  demand,  and  export  demand  are  ronment is rarely constant over many years, it is the
required. Fortunately, a set of consistently estimated  short-run results that are of interest here.
and  current  elasticities  of supply  and  demand  is  SIMULATION RESULTS
available in the literature.
From Duffy, Wohlgenant, and Richardson (1987),  The  relationships  described  in  (7)  through  (14)
the short-run (one year) own-price elasticity of sup-  were initially  simulated for  a 5-cent-a-pound  sub-
ply is taken to be 0.3. This estimate is in line with  sidy under  the assumptions  of a domestic  supply
previous  estimates  by Shumway  and by  Gardner.  elasticity of 0.3, an export demand elasticity of-2.0,
From Wohlgenant,  the price elasticity  of domestic  and a domestic demand elasticity of -0.3. Sensitivity
demand was assumed to be -0.3. This elasticity was  of the results to changes in the export demand elas-
in line  with those obtained by Lowenstein  and by  ticity was then evaluated.
Waugh.  In developing  their  separate  estimates  of  Because the relationship of market price to target
domestic  supply  and  demand  elasticities,  Duffy,  price is extremely important in determining both the
Richardson,  and  Wohlgenant  (1987)  and  Wohl-  level of supply response and the changes  in costs
genant  used  the  same  data  sources  and  approxi-  associated  with  introducing  the  export  subsidy,  a
mately  the same data period for estimation.3 Thus,  stochastic  specification for beginning market price
although these elasticities come from separate stud-  was used. Based on producer price data from 1981
ies, they were consistently estimated.  to  1987, price was assumed to be normally distrib-
While  there  appears  to be  some concensus  con-  uted  with  a  mean  of  58  cents  per pound  and  a
cerning  the elasticity  of domestic  supply  and de-  standard  deviation  of 5  cents a pound. The  initial
mand, estimates  of the elasticity  of export demand  shares,  Ka  and Kx,  were  each assumed  to be  1/2,
have not been consistent.  In their review of studies  based  on sales  in recent years.  For calculation of
of price elasticities of export demand for agricultural  government costs, the initial production  level was
commodities,  Gardiner and Dixit report seven esti-  assumed to be  12,650,000 bales, a figure based on
mates  of the elasticity  of export  demand for  U.S.  production  through  the  1980s.  Percent  change  in
cotton,  ranging from -0.02 (Taylor and Collins)  to  government cost was calculated using the difference
-5.5  (Johnson). Wohlgenant used both econometric  between  the  costs  calculated  in  (14)  and  (13),
estimation and calculation to derive an estimate of  where(14) represents costs with the subsidy and (13)
the  elasticity  of  export  demand.  Both  methods  represents costs without the subsidy. The simulation
yielded an estimate close to -2.0 for the direct own-  was run 100 times using different observations from
price  short-run  elasticity  of  export  demand.  This  the price distribution.
value is close to that obtained by Duffy, Richardson,  Two different policy options  were analyzed.  The
and Wohlgenant  (1990)  for the direct  elasticity of  1990  provisions of the  1985  Farm Bill were ana-
3Data used for estimating the elasticity of supply covered the time period 1959 to 1983 (Duffy, Richardson,  and Wohlgenant).
Data used for estimating the elasticity of export demand also covered the time period  1959 to 1983  (Duffy, Wohlgenant,  and
Richardson).  Data used to estimate the elasticity  of domestic demand covered the time period  1965 to 1981  (Wohlgenant).
3Table 1. Effects of a $0.05 a Pound Export Subsidy under a Fully Implemented  Marketing  Loan
1990 Program  Provisionsa  1991  Program  Provisionsa
Mean Percentage Change in:  Nx= -1.00  Nx = -2.00  Nx = -1.00  Nx = -2.00
Domestic  Price  6.08  7.07  6.44  7.35
Domestic  Mill Use  -1.82  -2.12  -1.93  -2.21
Exports  2.56  3.15  2.20  2.60
Government Costs  -5.60  -10.92  -4.76  -9.50
Percentage of Times Subsidy Reduces Government Outlays  79  100  100  100
Mean  Percentage of Subsidy
Received  by Producers as Higher Price  70  81  74  85
"  Nx is  the elasticity of export demand for U.S. cotton. Initial price distributed normally with a mean of $.58 and a
standard deviation  of $0.05. 1990 program  provisions (under the 1985 Farm  Bill) include a target price of $.729  and an
acreage reduction  program  of 12.5 percent. 1991  provisions (under the 1985 Farm  Bill) include a target price of $.729,
an acreage  reduction program  of 5 percent, and an additional 15 percent of acreage ineligible for deficiency payments.
Results based on  100 iterations. Percentage of times the government saves money is the number of iterations (out of
100) in which the export subsidy results in  a decrease in government  outlays.
lyzed,  as well  as the  1991  provisions  of the  1990  Thus, 80 percent of each program acre is eligible for
Farm  Bill.  Under  the  1990  provisions,  the  target  the  target  price  of  72.9  cents  and  15  percent  is
price  was  72.9  cents  per  pound  and  the  acreage  expected  to  receive  the  mean  market  price.  The
reduction requirement was  12.5 percent.  Using the  remaining 5 percent of the acre is idled.
Houck  method  of determining  effective  support  Under  the  1985  Farm  Bill, there  were  different
price,  this resulted in an effective  support price of  options for the loan program. If the marketing loan
63.79  cents per pound.  (See Duffy et al.,  1987, for  was  implemented,  and  formulae  adjusted  to  cor-
detailed information on how the Houck method was  rectly account for transportation differentials,  CCC
used under recent farm program provisions.) Under  stock accumulation should not have been problem-
the 1990 provisions of the 1985 Farm Bill, virtually  atic regardless of the market price.  Under the 1990
all production was eligible for deficiency  payment.  Farm Bill, a full marketing  loan system is the only
Hence,  the parameter  0  in equation  (14)  was set  loan option.  Knutson,  Penn, and Boehm state that
equal to one. The 1991 provisions of the 1990 Farm  "the marketing  loan effectively  removes  the floor
Bill include  a 72.9-cent-a-pound  target price and a  price set by a loan rate that is  'too high."' They also
5  percent  acreage  reduction requirement.  In addi-  state that the marketing  loan "is  very effective  at
tion, the 1990 Farm Bill designates  another 15 per-  clearing out government stocks." Thus, in the initial
cent of program acreage as ineligible for deficiency  simulation, government stock accumulation was not
considered, and the distribution of market price was payment.  Thus, the  parameter  0 in  equation  (14)  paym  t.  Ts te  p  e  0  not truncated  by  a  loan  rate.  The marketing  loan would be less than one. Because this acreage, called  provision  essentially  results  in  a  two-tiered  defi-
normal flex acreage, can be planted  in a variety of  ciency  payment,  with the  government  paying the
crops, including, but not limited to, cotton, the actual  difference between market price (even if it is below
percentage of 1991  cotton that will be eligible for  the loan rate) and the target price. Thus,  marketing
deficiency payment is difficult to determine. Given  loan costs are incorporated  into equations  (13)  and
the specialized equipment needed for cotton produc-  (14)  of this paper.  (See Knutson et al. for detailed
tion, however, it was hypothesized that very little of  descriptions  of  the  various  farm  program  provi-
the normal flex acreage  would be planted to crops  sions.)
other than cotton.4 Thus, 0 was set equal to 0.85. The  Results from simulation of the subsidy under the
effective  support- price  for cotton  under  the  1991  1990 and  1991  program provisions are reported  in
provisions of the  1990 Farm Bill was calculated as:  Table  1.5  When demand elasticity  was assumed to
Ps =.80*72.9 + .15*58  = 67.02  be  -2.00,  and  the  1990  farm  program  provisions
4Preliminary results  of a mixed integer programming  model of representative southeastern cotton farms appear to verify this
assumption.
5Because normal flexed acres may be planted to crops other than cotton, it is possible that there will be supply response even
when the market price remains below the effective support price. The  1991 provisions were therefore evaluated under a model in
which 15 percent of the acreage  was assumed to respond to market price, regardless of the relationship between market price and
effective support price. Given the relatively  low elasticity of supply, the results  of these simulations did not differ substantially  from
those reported in Tables 1  and 2.
4Table 2.  Effects of a $0.05 a Pound Export Subsidy under a Traditional Nonrecourse Loan
1990 Program  1991  Program
Provisionsa  Provisionsa
Mean  Percentage Change in:  Nx= -1.00  Nx = -2.00  Nx = -1.00  Nx =  -2.00
Domestic  Price  5.83  6.83  6.20  7.10
Domestic  Mill Use  -1.75  -2.05  -1.86  -2.13
Exports  2.79  3.60  2.43  3.05
Government Costs  -5.15  -10.49  -4.30  -9.07
Percentage of Times Subsidy Reduces Government Outlays  75  97  96  97
Mean Percentage of Subsidy
Received by Producers  as Higher Price  67  79  72  82
a Nx is  the elasticity of export demand for U.S.  cotton. Initial price distributed  normally with a mean of $.58 and a
standard deviation of $0.05.  1990 program  provisions  (under the 1985 Farm  Bill)  include a target price of $.729 and an
acreage reduction  program of 12.5 percent.  1991  provisions (under the 1985 Farm  Bill) include a target price of $.729,
an acreage  reduction program  of 5 percent,  and an additional 15 percent of acreage ineligible for deficiency payments.
Nonrecourse loan  of $0.50 a pound in both program years.  Results based on  100  iterations. Percentage of times the
government  saves money is the number of iterations  (out of 100)  in which the export subsidy results in a decrease in
government  outlays.
were  assumed  to  be  in place,  the  5  cent subsidy
resulted in an average domestic price increase of 7.1  nootion of the  traditional  loan  pro  m  is
percent and a decrease in average government cost  dbelow  the  loan  rate,  the initial price is  set equal to
of 10.9 percent.  In 100 percent of the runs, govern-  eloan rate and stocks are accumulated so that
ment costs decreased.  On average, 81 percent of the  t  o  r  a  o  r  a  o 
subsidy  was  passed  through  to  the  producers  in  (15)  Q  +  =  (KN  dNd) (Pd-  LR)
terms of higher market price.  P
When the full elasticity of export demand  (Nx  =  where Q,, is the quantity of CCC stocks,  Po is the
-1.00) is used to account for induced changes in the  price that would have prevailed in the absence of a
price of competitors' cotton resulting from a lowered  loan rate, and LR is the loan rate.
U. S. export price, the export subsidy is slightly less  With the export subsidy in place, the market price
effective  in  raising  domestic  price  and  reducing  that  would  prevail  in  the  absence  of the  loan  is
government  expenditures. In this case, the govern-  calculated  using (12).  If this price is above the loan
ment saves money 79 percent of the time when the  rate,  no  stocks  are  accumulated.  If the  domestic
1990 provisions are in place.  market price under the export subsidy is still below
The  results of the simulation under the 1991 farm  the loan rate, then the domestic market price is once
The results of the simulation under the 1991 farm
program  provisions  are  similar  to  those  obtained  again set to the loan rate  and the new  quantity of
under  the  1990  provisions.  Regardless  of the  as-  stocks  accumulated  is  calclated  using  (15).  Be-
sumed  elasticity of export demand, the export sub-  cause of increased export sales with the subsidy, this
sumed elasticity of export demand, the export sub-  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^^  ^^ 
sidy, on average, reduces government expenditures.  acumulat  wi  out the subsiy  ch
Under the 1991 farm program provisions, the export  auulated wtut te subsidy.
subsidy always saves money, even when the elastic-  In  Table  2,  results  are  reported  for  the  export
sity  of expor  demand  is assumed to be -1.0.  las  subsidy under a traditional loan program under both
the  1990  and  1991  cotton  program  provisions.  In
SIMULATION RESULTS UNDETT  R A  calculating  government cost, a storage cost for cot-
TRADITIONAL LOAN PROGRAM  ton  in  the  loan  program  was  included.  For  this
analysis, a storage cost of approximately three cents
As  can be  seen  by  the  periods  of  increase  in  per pound per year, based on 1990 storage charges,
government  stocks during the last decade, the mar-  was used.  Outlays for the commodity  itself are not
keting loan provision of the  1985 Farm Bill  is not  generally  considered  a direct  cost of the program
always effectively enforced.  Accordingly, the simu-  because,  in theory, the commodity  will be sold  at
lation  was also done under  the  assumption that a  some future date. In reality, however, expensive PIK
traditional loan program was in effect, using a loan  programs have  often been implemented  to reduce
rate of 50¢ per pound.  unwanted stocks.6 Thus, the reduction in cost of the
6PIK, or payment in kind, programs involve farmers idling acreage in exchange  for payment with government owned
commodities.  (See Knutson et al., chapter  10.)domestic programs resulting from an export subsidy  expected to be below the target price. When a tradi-
is probably underestimated in this study.  tional loan rate is in effect, the export subsidy is not
Even with a traditional loan program in effect, the  quite as effective at reducing direct costs of the farm
export subsidy usually reduces government expen-  program,  but still  results  in  reduced  government
ditures.  Under the 1990 provisions,  even when the  costs  most  of the time.  Another  consideration  in
elasticity of export demand is assumed  to be -1.0,  designing  an  export  subsidy  is  the possibility  of
the subsidy reduces  expenditures  75 percent of the  retaliation.  Although this study used both a high and
time,  with  average  savings  of 5.6 percent  of the  low estimate of the elasticity  of export demand, no
original  costs. With a more elastic export demand,  specific retaliation was involved. Retaliation by for-
the subsidy reduces  expenditures  97 percent of the  eign  competitors  could  make  the  program  very
time.  costly.
Under  the  1991  program  provisions,  the export  Finally, the impact of the export subsidy on con-
subsidy reduces  government  expenditures  96  per-  sumers was not considered. In the final analysis, the
cent of the time when the elasticity of export demand  gains to domestic producers and taxpayers must be
is assumed to be -1.00,  and average savings are 4.3  weighed  against  anticipated  losses  to  consumers
percent.  With an export elasticity of -2.00, the sub-  caused by higher domestic prices brought about by
sidy saves money 97 percent of the time, and average  the export subsidy. Studies in measurement  of wel-
savings are over nine percent.  fare  losses  in  this  case  are  non-trivial,  however,
TTT~CONCLUSIONS  because  of existing distortions  due to government
ICONCLUSIONS  intervention  (see Just, Hueth, and Schmitz, chapter
An export subsidy may be a method to reduce the  4).  Therefore,  the question of the measurement  of
costs of the cotton program when market prices are  net welfare changes is a topic for future work.
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